Topics for diploma, master's, bachelor's, and term papers

Theses can generally be assigned on any topic related to microeconomics. Students who wish to write theses in the following subject areas are particularly welcome:

• Behavioral economics
• Industrial economics
• Game theory
• Economic theory of politics
• Economic theory of federal systems
• Other areas of public finance
• Institutional economics
• Economic analysis of law
• Regional economics.

However, topics from other areas with a microeconomic connection are also possible.

There is no prepared list of topics at the chair. Instead, we recommend the following procedure:

1. Think about which topic would interest you in general. These can be specific ideas that define the topic relatively precisely.
2. Please contact us at the chair (preferably by email first) with your topic request.
3. We deal with a large number of different examination regulations, which we do not all know by heart. Therefore, please inform yourself in good time about the requirements and conditions (e.g., processing time) specified in your examination regulations!
4. Together, we will then narrow down the topic to a specific question suitable for a bachelor's, master's, or diploma thesis and discuss the next steps in detail.

When you start working on your thesis, please be sure to follow the formal guidelines on this page.

You can write your thesis in German or English.

The following examples will give you an impression of the wide range of topics that can be covered in the field of microeconomics:

Industrial economics

Numerous companies, such as hotel reservation portals and electronics retail chains, offer best price guarantees. But how do these work from an economic perspective? Do they really help consumers? Loyalty discounts seem to benefit consumers. But aren't they also a barrier to market entry? And what does this mean for consumers? Cartel formation always takes place at the expense of the consumers affected. But what is the ultimate effect of a private right of action?

Economics of Conflict

Nuclear weapons pose a threat – but they may also have prevented the Cold War from turning into a real war. What are the game-theoretical reasons for this? What are the security policy implications of a no-first-use policy by nuclear powers? The EU will soon begin negotiations with the United Kingdom on its withdrawal. What are the optimal strategies from a game theory perspective? The so-called democratic peace is an empirical phenomenon: democracies do not wage war against each other. But why?

Economic analysis of international law

What function does international law actually fulfill from an institutional economic perspective? From an economic point of view, what kind of contract are we actually dealing with here? Why are some areas of intergovernmental conflict more regulated than others? How impartial are international courts and arbitration tribunals, and are the widespread fears surrounding international trade agreements justified?

Procrastination

“Don't put off until tomorrow what you can do today!” Everyone has heard this well-meaning advice at some point – but how many people actually follow it? Many people like to put off unpleasant tasks until the last minute and prefer to join Facebook groups such as “I have a motivation problem until I have a time problem.”

rather than finally studying for their next exam – even though they know that their behavior is not only useless in the long run, but actually harmful. Where does this motivation problem come from? Why does every task have to be completed so often just before the deadline? And how can you protect yourself from this? Find a microeconomic answer.

Bragging

Many people brag about achievements they never actually accomplished. However, since clarifying the actual state of affairs usually involves considerable expense, such bragging is rarely questioned. How can this behavior be explained? What behavioral economic patterns does this result in in interactions between people, and how will a rational individual evaluate information in the future?

Moral behavior

Imagine you live in a country that does not enforce the law. The same problems arise again and again. Public goods are not provided, corruption is everywhere, and people are out to get each other. Incentive problems constantly arise, and funds that should actually be invested for the common good are diverted for selfish purposes. But how far can we actually rely on people to act morally? When do they voluntarily contribute to public goods? When do they follow norms without being forced to do so?

The costs of political appeals

Politicians repeatedly try to manipulate our behavior through simple appeals, for example, to encourage us to protect the environment more. When such appeals have no economic incentive, they appear at first glance to be the best solution to almost any problem. The desired change in behavior is achieved and the costs of an information campaign are negligible. But do we really take all relevant costs into account? Or do we only change our behavior because we now feel guilty about continuing to drive to the bakery? If we take such pangs of conscience into account, it becomes clear that political appeals are not always a good idea from a welfare perspective.

The importance of emotions in strategic decisions

Emotions in strategic decision-making situations have long been ignored in economics. In modern research, they are playing an increasingly important role, among other things to investigate whether there are incentives to have them at all. But when does it make sense, individually and for the economy as a whole, to rely on emotions? And when is it inefficient?

Tax honesty

One would think that whether tax collection and payment obligations coincide or are separated in time is relatively irrelevant to the degree of tax compliance. From a behavioral economics perspective, this is not necessarily true. If the benefits of honesty outweigh the costs of paying taxes, individuals with a “present bias” will become more honest simply because of this. This may be a simple way to increase tax revenue!

Sin taxes

“Non, je ne regrette rien.” Who can say that about themselves? Many people occasionally regret some of their consumer decisions – after a night of heavy drinking or when stepping on the scales, perhaps. From an economic perspective, people who consume more of a good than they would like to have a problem with self-control. Can the state use taxes to protect us from such minor sins?

Sugar tax

With statements such as “sugar makes you sick” and “there is no need to consume sugar ... as food,” health insurance companies and the non-governmental organization Foodwatch are campaigning for the reintroduction of the sugar tax in Germany, and are supported in this by members of the Bundestag Health Committee. A Pigou tax can lead to greater welfare in the presence of negative externalities and even generate tax revenue. To what extent can a sugar tax be justified in microeconomic terms, and what are the consequences?

Abstinence

"Hermann was the son of a German who had become Russian and left him a small fortune. Firmly convinced of the need to consolidate his independence, Hermann did not even touch the interest, but lived exclusively on his salary and did not allow himself the slightest extravagance. [...] He was extremely passionate, with a fiery imagination, but his self-control saved him from the usual aberrations of youth. For example, he was a gambler by nature, but he never picked up a card because he believed that his situation (as he put it) did not allow him to sacrifice the necessary to gain the superfluous – and yet he spent entire nights at the card tables, feverishly following the various twists and turns of the game." This is how Pushkin describes his antihero from The Queen of Spades. Is he portraying a realistic character from a microeconomic point of view? It is difficult to explain such abstinence in a completely rational individual. Is the marginal utility of the first game already negative, or at least lower than the impending loss, which is likely to be close to zero in a single game? The explanation is easier if one allows humans to have small weaknesses in their rationality: Perhaps the first game reveals to Hermann himself how much he likes to gamble – and then there is no stopping him on the path to gambling addiction... Those who never find out whether gambling is fun are probably better off and – quite rationally – refrain from trying.